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One of the most pressing problems facing the world today is pollution and the
accompanying degradation of the natural environment. Households and firms pollute too
much, because they do not face a price for the damage they inflict on the environment. In this
sense environmental policy can be viewed as a problem of missing markets. The government
may therefore introduce markets for pollution permits or, alternatively, resort to Pigovian tax
and subsidy schemes.l In other words, governments impose an implicit or an explicit correc-
tive tax on polluting activities in such a way that the private cost is raised to the social cost.
When the revenues are handed back to the polluters in a lump-sum fashion, the first-best
outcome can be sustained in a decentralised competivive market economy.a
However, another major task of governments is to raise taxes fror a variety oC sources
in order to finance public spending. This is straightforward if lump-sum taxes are available.
However, in practice governments have to resort to distortionary taxes. In order to minimise
the excess burden of taxation, governments should adopt a mix of tax instruments and, if
cross-price effects are not too strong, tax most heavily those commodities that feature
relatively low price elasticities (Ramsey, 1927).
The crucial policy question is what governments should do when they face the dual
task of on the one hand internalising environmental externalities and on the other hand raising
tax revenues to finance Dublic spending. The relevant problem is thus one of designíng the
appropriate environmental policy in a second-best world in which a sizeable public sector
gives rise to serious tax distortions. One might argue that the best response in such a setting is
to introduce dirt taxes to internalise pollution (or to auction off pollution permits) and to use
[he revenues to reduce the distortionary tax rates elsewhere in the economy. In particular, an
increase in the (non-distortionary) dirt tax rate accompanied by a cut in the tax on labour may
kill two birds with one stone: (i) an improvement in the quality of the environment; (ii) a boost
to employment and an expansion of the labour tax base due to a lower tax wedge between
producer and consumer wages. Pearce (1991) has called this the "double dividend" hypothesis.
Following Ulph (1991), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1992) and Pezzey (1992), this paper
analyses the interaction of environmental and tax policy in a second-best world in which
lump-sum taxes are not available. The main innovation of this paper is to analyse the optimal
setting of dirt and labour taxes from a Pigou-Ramsey perspective, building on the pioneering
1 If the government has an explicit environmental target which overrides all other
objectives of economic policy, it is best to introduce a market for pollution permits as this
overcomes information problems. In general, however, it is not clear whether it is optimal to
use pollution permits or Pigovian taxes and subsidies.
2 Instead, some argue that, if property rights are well defined, polluters and the victims of
pollution should engage in bilateral negotiations. This may lead to an efficient oucome as well
(Coase, 1960). However, such a"laissez faire" policy fails in practice because it only applies if
transaction costs are neglible and only a few parties are involved.2
work of Sandmo (1975), and to simultaneously consider the optimal level and composition of
public consumption (cf., Atkinson and Stern, 1974) and the optimal level of abatement
activities. In order to obtain more specific results, preferences are restrícted in such a way that
the private decision on the composition of the private consumption basket in clean and dirty
products is weakly separable from the decision to work. Moreover, the consumption of
marketable goods, i.e. the basket of clean and dirty private goods and leisure, is weakly separ-
able from the consumption of social goods, i.e. the basket of public consumption goods and the
quality of the natural environment. Ulph (1991) and Pezzey (1992) only investigate the optimal
setting of the labour and the dirt tax rates under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences
and an exogeneous revenue constraint. This paper, in contrast, analyses the optimsl tax
structure and the optimal level and compositíon of public consumption and abatement
activities in the more general case of homothetic preferences.
Section 2 investigates environmental and tax policy in a first-best world where lump-
sum taxes and subsidies are available. In this setting it also analyses the optimal provision of
clean and dirty public consumption goods and the optimal level of public abatement activities.
Assuming that only distortionary taxes are feasible, section 3 discusses the Ramsey tax rules
and the optimal provision of public goods if environmental externalities are absent. Section 4
integrates the results of sections 2 and 3. Within the framework of optimal distortionary
taxation, it simultaneously considers the correction for environmental externalities, the
provision of clean and dirty public consumption goods and the level of public abatement
activities. Section 5 restricts preferences in such a way that the demand for cfean and dirty
private commodities is weakly separable from leisure and that the demand for social goods is
weakly separable from the demand for marketable goods. Section 6 loglinearises both the
model of private behaviour and the conditions characterising optimal public policy in order to
more closely examine the "double dividend" hypothesis. Section 7 explores how an increase in
env;ronmental concern affects the optimal level of abatement activities, the optimal provision
of clean and dirty public consumption and the optimal tax mix. We find that an increased
concern for the environment induces a higher dirt tax (or a higher price for pollution permits),
a lower tax on labour, more consumption of leisure, less production and a cleaner environ-
ment. If the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure is less than unity,
"green" and "blue" political parties are compatible in the sense that the basket of marketable
goods expands and the basket of public goods contracts if the concern for the environment
increases. However, a rise in public consumption may accompany increased environmental
concern, if the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure is large and between
clean and dirty goods is small. In that case "red" and "green" political parties are compatible. In
this case, most of the improvement in environmental quality is due to a lower level rather than
a different composition of economic activity. With a unitary elasticity of substitution between3
private goods and leisure, production and unemployment are unaffected and environmental
quality is enhanced onty through a cleaner composition oC economic activity. Section 8
explores the impact of more priority for public consumption. It confirms that public con-
sumption and the quality of the environment move together if substitution between dirty and
clean goods is difficult compared to substitution between leisure and private commodities.
Section 9 concludes with a summary of results and suggestions for further research.
2 Enriroomental polfcy in a tirst-best world
1.l The command economy
The representative consumer derives utility (U) from the consumption of marketable
goods, namely clean private goods (C), dirty private goods (D) and leisure (V). Furthermore,
social goods, vi-. clean public goods (X), dirty public goods (Y) and the quality of the environ-
ment (E), raise utility. The util~ty func[ion for the representative consumer is thus denoted by
U-u(C,D,V,X,Y,E). The quality of the environment detoriates when private agents or the
public sector consume more dirty goods. However, environmental quality improves when the
government engages in abatement activities (A), i.e. E-e(NDtY,A) with eNDeeY~O and e~~0,
where N stands for the number of private agents in the economy. Private agents ignore
environmental externalities when they decide on the consumption oC dirty products.
Producers face a linear constant-returns-to-scale technology in which output is
proportional to employment (L) and can be used for consumption of (clean and dirty) private
and public goods and for public spending on abatement activities.' The material balance
condition for the economy is thus given by:
~~NL-~~N(I-V)-~~NCt~pNDi~XXt~yYt~~A, ~;i0. (2.1J
Each worker-consumer has one unit of time available which can be used for either work (L) or
leisure (V). We assume, without loss of generality, that ~;-l, i-C,D,X,Y,A. The production
price associated with these goods acts thus as the numeraire. The production price of labour,
the product wage, is denoted by ~~~)4.
It is of some interest to consider as a benchmark the first-best outcome, which is
attainable in a command economy. In such an economy, the social planner maximises utility of
the representative household subject to the material balance condition (2.1). This yields the
following optimality conditions:
s Relaxing the assumption of fized producer prices and linear technology dces not affect
the results as Iong as producer prices result from competitive behaviour and producers face
constant returns to scale (or pure profits are taxed away under decreasing returns to scale) (cf.,
Auerbach, 1985).4
UC ~~-t Uy ~ NUx ~ Up f NUgeNp ~ N(Uy4Ugey) ~ NU~Cw.
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and clean products must equal the relevant
marginal rate of transformation, i.e. the product wage. The marginal utility of clean private
products must be set to the sum of the marginal utilities of clean public goods for each of the
private agents (cf., Samuelson, 1954). The marginal utility of clean products must equal that of
dirty products minus a term correcting for the environmental externality (note eNp-ey~0).
This correction term drives up the consumption of clean products at the expense of the
consumption of dirty products in order to reduce pollution and ensure an optimal quality of
the environment. This condition must hold for both private and public goods. Finally, the sum
of marginal utilities of a cleaner natural environment resulting from public abatement
activities must equal the marginal utility of clean private products.
2.2 Po![utiort taxes irt a market economy: A Pigovian view
The first-best outcome discussed in section 2.1 is onty sustainable in a decentralised
market economy if lump-sum taxes and subsidies are available. To see this, interpret the
material balance condition (2.1) as the equilibrium condition for the goods market and VtL-1
as the condition for equilibrium in the labour market. If firms maximise profits under perfect
competition, the producer prices of clean and dirty private products, clean and dirty public
goods and abatement are ~c`~u-~x`~Y'~w-1 and the producer wage is ~L. The budget con-
straint for a typical consumer is:
PcCiPpD-(I-r~)~LtT (1.31
where Pc and Pp denote the consumption prices of, respectively, clean and dirty products, t~
stands for the Iabour tax rate and T represents lump-sum transfers provided by the
government to each household. The consumption wage is denoted by P~-(I-t~)p and cor-
responds to the opportunity cost of leisure. The government can also levy specific taxes on
clean and dirty products, so that P~ L Itt~, i-C,D where tc denotes the clean tax and tp denotes
the dirt tax. The optimality conditions for the representative consumer in a competitive market
economy are:
(uc)Pc) z (upIPD) - (uvl[(t-tL)6D - a (2.4)
where a denotes marginal private utility of income. The government can thus achieve the
first-best outcome characterised by (1.1), if it levies no taxes on consumption of clean goods
and on labour income, i.e. tc-tL-O, sets the dirt tax equal to5
!p ~- N UE eND (up t N UE eND)~t t- N UE 2Np uC-1 ~ O (1.5)
and determines the quantities of the two public goods and of abatement activities from (1.2).
This Pigovian dirt tax is denoted by tD~. This can also be interpreted as the price of auctioned
pollution permits. The government budget constraint then determines the amount of lump-sum
transfers (taxes) that must be handed back to (levied on) the public if revenues exceed (fall
short of) public spending, i.e. NT~tpND-X-Y-A. Equivalent to the dirt tax (1.5) is a subsidy
on clean goods combined with a tax on labour of equal magnitude, namely t~~-t~~-
N(UEeNp~Up)1O.
3 Distortions and public goods: Ramsey tax schemes
In practice, the government must resort to distortionary taxes as lump-sum taxes and
subsidies are not available (T-0). This section derives the Ramsey tax rules, which yield the
least distortionary way of financing a given Ievel of public spending if environmental
externalities are absent (uEsO). It also examines the conditions for the optimal level of public
spending. The remaining sections then turn to the general policy problem in which taxes face
the dual task of generating revenues to finance public spending and internalising environ-
ment~l externalities.
3.1 Tax struclure
Since a labour tax is equivalent to a uniform tax on clean and dirty private products
and a dirt tax is the natural candidate for inducing private agents to pollute less, we assume
(without loss of generality) [hat C is the untaxed good. There is thus no explicit tax on clean
private commodities (P~zl). This assumption accords most closely with the political debate
about the interactions between optimal environmental and tax policies and, in particular, about
the "double dividend" hypothesis. When a given amount of public spending, XtYtA, has to be
financed by distortionary taxation, the optimal tax structure must satisfy (cf., Atkinson and
Stigliti, 1980, Chapter 12; Auerbach, 1985):
x D- V ID ' rn






where p denotes the marginal disutility of raising a unit of government revenues and thus
measures the scarcity of public funds. Using the Slutsky decompositions (31~3Pp)-S;D-
(8l~8T)D and (8I~8P~)-S;Lt(2I~8T)L, i~D,L, where S represents the (symmetric and negative6
definite) Slutsky matrix, one obtains:
~
r (W-~~l S~ S~ D , l
r D ~-- 1 ii I S S (-L} ~~~~1`(ro í3T i~r1a7'J D ~ DL (L~
(3.3)
The marginal socia! utility of prívate income (a') may exceed the marginal private utility of
income (a) as it takes acount of the increased tax revenues resulting from additional private
expenditures. Negative definiteness of the Slutsky matrix in (3.3) implies that p exceeds a' for
positive government revenues (cf., Auerbach, 19g5, p.112). Defining E~t~PkS~k~I as the
compensated elasticity of demand for commodity i(1) with respect to the price of commodity
k and using Slutsky symmetry (ELD--aDEDL where aD denotes the private budget share of dirty
goods), one can rewrite equation (3.3) in terms of elasticities:
tD
9 ltr ~ e -e t
(0D) . r~D - 1 W 1(-e~ eu ) ( 11)~
(3.3')
1-r~





( r~ ( e~-e~ l(~-~~1. (3.5)
- 11-rc - 1-enaeu'erDenr.J ` V J
The marginal disutility of financing public spending (p) exceeds the marginal social utility of
private income (a') if public revenues are positive. Moreover, negative definiteness of the
Slutsky matrix implies that the denominator in the first term in brackets in the expression for
BL in (3.5) is positive. Hence, the tax on labour is positive if and only if ELD exceeds EDD.4
Since compensated demand functions depend only on relative prices, E~LS-(E~~tE~D),
i-D,L must hold. Hence, using Slutsky symmetry (i.e. ELD--aDEDL and ELC--(1-aD)ECL), we
~ If E E ~0 and E- E e uation 3.4 shows that it is o timal to have a uniform LD~ DL LL-- DD~ q ( ) p
tax on dirty products and labour supply. It is optimal to have a higher (lower) dirt tax than
labour taz if the own price elasticity of the compensated supply of Iabour (ELL) exceeds (falls
short of) that for dirty private goods (-EDD). Similarly, it can be shown that, if E~D-ED~-O and
ECC'EDD~ ~t is optimal to levy a uniform tax on clean and dirty products (equivalent to a tax on
labour). If the own price elasticity of the demand for clean products (-E~~) is lower (higher)
than that of dirty products (-EDD), it is optimal to give (Ievy) an additional subsidy (taz) on
dirty products. These special cases illustrate the Ramsey rule which states that it is optimal to
tax goods with a low price elasticity more heavily than goods with a high price elasticity.7
can write (3.4) as:
I rD l ecl-ea
0D ~ I 1}ro I~ ecD-e~ 0L. (3.4')
Government policy involves a uniform tax on both clean and dirty products, i.e. a tax
on labour, and in addition a dirt tax. The sign of the dirt tax depends on the cross-elasticities
with le;sure. In particular, the dirt tax is positive if clean goods are better substitutes for
leisure than dirty goods are (fct.'EVt.). ln that case, dirty goods are the relative complement to
leisure. Accordingly, it is optimal for the government to levy a uniform tax on clean and dirty
products, i.e. tax labour, and to levy an additional tax on the product that is most complemen-
tary to leisure.b
3.1 Choire helwren puh(ic and pr(v~ .~ gonds
In the absence of lump-sum taxes and subsidies, the marginal rate of transformation
between private and public goods no longer corresponds to the (sum of) the marginal rate(s) of
substitution between private and public goods as in Samuelson (1954). This may be seen from
the following condition for the optimal provision of public goods (cf., Atkinson and Stern,
I974):
N( uc) - q[1 - rD N ~ aX) - rl ~ N( óX)~ q.( a~
(3.6 )
where q denotes the marginal cost of public funds (in terms of the numeraire). There are two
reasons why the marginal rate of transformation between private and public goods differs
from the corresponding sum of the marginal rates of substitution.
The first reason is that, if public goods are complementary to taxed commodities
(aD~aXiO or at~aX~o), raising public spending alleviates the excess burden of distortionary
taxation by boosting the concumption of taxed commodities. For example, the construction of
public highways between suburbs and cities may induce some agents to work more and, there-
fore, pay more tax on their labour income. Moreover, they may buy more heavily taxed
commodities such as petrol and cars. Public libraries, in contrast, may encourage private agents
to enjoy more leisure, thereby eroding the base of the labour tax. The social cost of funds
devoted to libraries is thus higher than tha[ of funds allocated to highways.
The second reason for the divergence between the marginal rates of transformation and
6 An alternative is to think of government policy as employing a clean tax and a dirt tax
with labour as the untaxed good. The implicit price of clean products then amounts to (1-ly)-1
and the associated tax rate tL(1-t~)-1. The implicit price of dirty products equals (Ittpxl-ty)-1
and the implicit dirt taz rate is (rDtr~xl-tL) .8
substitution is that, if p exceeds a, an increase in government revenues exacerbates the
deadweight loss of distortionary taxation and thus raises the marginal cost oC public funds.
However, if taxed commodities are inferior, p may be less than a. In that case, the negative
income effect associated with a higher tax level alleviates the excess burden because it raises
the consumption of taxed goods. Hence, additional revenues reduce rather than raise the
marginal cost of public funds.
4 Pollutloo and labour taxatlon in a second-best world
This section again considers a second-best world in which lump-sum transfers are
excluded (TLO). In contrast to the previous section, however, environmental externalities are
present in consumption. Accordingly, labour and dirt taxes are employed not only to finance
public spending but also to internalise environmental externalities. These externalities affect
the Ramsey tax rules and the optimal provision of public goods.
4.1 Tas struclure
In the presence of environmental externalities, equations (3.1)-(3.1) become
pf dD dl 1 ~ dD f dD dL 1 J~D - IID,tD
áP a~t`dP 1- Nu~
dP - aD - PIID.(tD-r~ dP . ptcaP 11 - 0 ( 4.l j
D D D D D
xL- P~L'(rD-rDr)~dP~- Pt~~p~~-0 (4.21
c i
where uÉ denotes the marginal social utility of the environment:
dD dL
u8 ~ W tD dE ` Br`áE
uE . dD 1 -Ne~-
dE
(4.3J
uÉ accounts not only for the direct impact of the environment on utility (uE~O), but also for
the indirect effects of an improved environment on the taz base. Furthermore, if a better
environmental quality raises the demand for dirty goods (i.e. 8D~8Ei0), the net social utility of
the environment is reduced (as eND~O).
The Pigovian component of the optimal dirt tax, 1Dp, can (using a3uc and qap~a) be
written as:9
r ( Netroue ( 1 l -( -Neem 1 Iue }r dD t r dL
nr'I- uc 1nl II`1-N dD1lP odE ~~dE).
` ~ dE
(4.4 )
The Pigovian dirt tax component corrects for the environmental damage due to the con-
sumption of dirty private products. The Pigovian tax rises with the marginal social utility of
the environment (uÉ). If the marginal cost of social funds is unity (i.e. p-~~a-1) and environ-
mental quality (E) is weakly separable from the other arguments in u(.) (so that uE3uE), the
Pigovian tax (scaled by the environmental damage per unit of dirty private consumption, (-
eNp)) amounts to the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good of the
environment and the clean commodity:
1 r~ I 3 1 ucaI
(4.4' 1
If the marginal cost of public funds rises above unity (i.e. n~l), the environmental tax declines.
The reason is that the optimal environmental tax equates the social costs of environmental
damage due to dirty private consumption to the social benefit of additional tax revenue due to
that consumption. A high marginal cost of public funds indicates that tax revenue is scarce.
This implies that dirty consumption has to yield less tax revenue to offset environmental
damage. Indced, the optimal Pigovian tax measures the environmental damage in terms of
public revenue (rather than private income). Accordingly, if public revenue becomes more
valuable compared to private income (i.e. q rises), the optimal environmental tax decreases.
Intuitively, high marginal costs of public funds indicate that public goods are expensive. In
these circumstances, the government can afford Iess tax differentiation aimed at environmental
protection as the revenue-raising objective of the tax system becomes relatively more
important. In this way, high cost of public funds reduces the demand not only for ordinary
public consumption but also for the public good of the environment.
In contrast to previous authors (e.g., Sandmo, 1975; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980;
Auerbach, 1985), our definition of the Pigovian tax (4.4) incorporates a second factor that
may cause the Pigovian tax to deviate from the sum of the marginal rates of substitution. In
particular, the environmental quality may directly impact the consumption of tazed commod-
ities. For example, if labour supply is taxed and an improved environment induces people to
enjoy more leisure and work less (i.e. 8L~8E~0), the social value of environmental protection is
reduced and the optimal environmental tax falls. In principle it is possible, albeit unlikely, that
the Pigovian component of the dirt tax is negative, namely if tax rates are high and if a better
environmental quality substantially reduces the demands for taxed goods.
Comparing the conditions for the optimal taz structure without environmentallo
externalities (i.e (3.l) and (3.2)) with those with externalities in consumption (i.e. (4.!) and
(4.2)), one notices that the terms with the dirt tax [D in (3.1) and (3.2) are replaced by terms
with the dirt tax net of the Pigovian tax term (tp-[pp) in (4.1) and (4.2). Clearly, the Ramsey
tax term (tp-tpp) is separable from the Pigovian tax term (tpP). Intuitively, the Ramsey tax
term measures the social contribution (in terms of government revenues) of additional demand
for dirty goods as the difference between a positive and a negative contribution. On the one
hand, consumption of dirty private goods boosts the tax base and thus facilitates the financing
of ordinary public goods. On the other hand, it damages the environment, thereby reducing
the supply of the "collective good" of the environment. It follows that the optimal dirt tax is
the sum of the Ramsey and Pigou terms (cf., Sandmo, 1975):
ecc-ent. tnr l
eo -( ecD-eDD el ~ e~' e~ .( l.tpl
(4.51
which replaces (.i.4'). Hence, even if the compensated elasticities of the demands for clean and
dirty goods with respect to the price of leisure are identical (i.e. EoL-EpL), a zero dirt tax is not
optimal. Although the Ramsey term (i.e. the first term on [he right-hand side of (4.5)) is zero,
a separate Pigovian dirt tax corrects for the environmental externality, namely tDP. This
encourages households to consume clean rather than dirty products and thus ensures an
optimum quality of the environment.
The formula for the optimal labour tax in (3.5) is not affected by environmental
externalities. This corresponds to the principle of targeting (e.g., Dixit, 1985), which states that
a distortion is best addressed by the instrument that acts directly on the relevant margin.
Hence, dirt rather than labour taxes should deal with environmental externalities.
It is instructive to write the condition for the optimal dirt tax as the weighted sum of
the Pigou and Ramsey terms (using (3.5), (4.4) and (4.5)):
~ t (~cienr)(1-ad I t NSm~á (4.6)
eo i (1-~ -EDDEI1~eDLelD I ~ ~ (1'rdac
The weight of the Ramsey term (ECL-EDL) ~s positive if government revenue from non-dirt
taxes is positive (as the Slutsky matrix is negative definite and n'ap~a'il). It rises with the
scarcity of public funds (reflected in a high value for tl). The weight of the Pigovian term, in
contrast, falls with the marginal cost of public funds (~).e Hence, if public funds become
scarcer, the Ramsey term becomes more important relative to the Pigovian term. Intuitively,
the tax structure focusses more on the revenue-raising rather than the environmental objective
e Typically, the weight given to the Pigovian term is less than one, but it may be greater
than one if tazed goods are inferior.II
if government revenue becomes more "expensive".
In a command economy the marginal cost of public funds is unity (tr~l). In a market
economy, in contrast, the marginal cost of public funds incorporates the costs of distortionary
taxation. This may be seen upon solving equation (4.1) for the marginal cost of public funds:
1 q (4.7)
- 1-(BD-8or)aDéu.-eceu.
The marginal cost of public funds exceeds unity if the financing of additional public spending
erodes the base of existing 'Ramsey' taxes. This occurs if there is a positive labour tax and the
Marshallian labour supply curve slopes upwards (E~~íO) or if the dirt tax exceeds the Pigovian
component (BD~BpP) and private demand for dirty goods falls as the tax on labour increases
(i.e. ep~ío).
4.1 Puhlic con.cumption: Level and composiNon
The condition for the optimal provision of clean public goods (3.6) becomes:
N luxl - qll-(ro-rDaNl aX~ t~N~laXJ
l.
cJ l 1 1 11
(4.8)
Comparing (3.h1 and (4.8), one notices that the dirt tax in (3.6) is again replaced by the
Ramsey component of the dirt tax in (4.8). Intuitively, only the revenues from the Ramsey
term provide a ne[ social benefit while the revenues from the Pigovian term merely compen-
sate for environmental damage. The optimality condition for dirty public goods is:
u .u~e N( Y u a r
",I(1-(ro-t~N~dY)-rLN~(aY),~ ( c l
(4.9)
Clearly, if public consumption pollutes the environment (i.e eYCO), the direct marginal utility
of public goods must be higher to compensate for the environmental damage caused by these
public goods.
4.3 Public abalemenl
Finally, the government engages in abatement until the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution between these activities and private consumption of clean goods equals the social
cost of abatement activities:1z
N I ue ex1
- 11 ~1 - N f(}D -jD~ a ~ .~r~~~l ex~,
l uc l J
(4.I0)
Note that, if public goods and the quality of the natural environment are weakly
separable from the other arguments in u(.), the marginal rate of substitution between the
environment and public consumption of clean commodities can with the aid of (4.4), (4.9) and
(4.10) be written as:
ux - ~uY~xux~ ~ -~Y~ s ~ -r~tID~ - A
(4.11J
The relative price of the environment in terms of public goods equals the dirt tax scaled by the
damage done by dirty (private) goods to environmental quality. Clearly, the marginal utility of
dirty public goods must ezceed that of clean public goods (i.e. uY~uX) so that (other things
being equal) the government consumes less dirty goods.
5 Restrictions oo preferences
5.! The utilitv lree
To obtain more specific results, we put restrictions on preferences. In particular,
preferences are described by the tree given in Figure I. Together with leisure, the basket of
clean and dirty priva[e goods (Q) determines the utility of marketable goods (M). Total utility
of the representative consumer (U) is a function of the "private" utility index M, the basket of
ctean and dirty public goods (G) and environmental quality (E). The budget shares are given at
the bottom of the branches of the utility tree given in Figure I. The utility function of the
representative consumer can thus be written in weakly separable form:
U - u(C,D,V,X,Y,E) ~ U(M(Q(C,D),V),G(X,Y),E). (5.1)
It is assumed that the utility function U(.) and the sub-utility functions M(.), G(.) and Q(.) are
homothetic.
The chosen structure of preferences implies strong restrictions on demand. In
particular, the compensated elasticities e~y and ep~ are idenucal. Accordingly, the Ramsey tax
term in (4.5) is zero and the dirt tax reduces to the Pigovian correction term (1DarDp).
Moreover, neither private demand for dirty goods nor labour supply depends directly on
public consumption or the quality of the environment. Hence, the social cost of public goods
(i.e. the right-hand side of expressions (3.6) and (4.8)-(4.10)) reduces to the marginal cost of
public funds (p). Furthermore, marginal social utility of the environment (uÉ) given in
expression (4.9) boils down to the direct effect of environmental quality on utility (uE).13
We assume that the function describing the quality of the environment takes the
following form:
E 3 e(NDtY,A) á Eo - 6(N D t Y) i e~(A), á,e~'?0, e~"~0 (5.2)
where Eo denotes the quality of the environment when it is not spoilt by pollution or improved
through abatement and é stands for the emission ratio. There are decreasing returns to
abatement activities.
5.1 The optimality conditions revisited
For the chosen structure oC preferences, (4.3)-(4.5) imply the following tax structure:
NUH 8 1l
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The optimal structure of public consumption follows Crom (4.B), (4.9) and (5.3):
Gx 1
GY - I `rD
(5.31
(5.4 )
The marginal rate of substitution between clean and dirty public goods equals the ratio of the
price of clean public goods (normalised to unity) to the social cost of dirty public goods. This
latter cost consists of the production price (unity) plus the dirt tax, which represents the
environmental costs.
From cquations (4.X), (4.9), (5,3) and u~~a-UMMq~Pq, where Pq denotes the "ideal"
price index for the private consumption basket Q (i.e. Pq-[Ct(Ittp)D]~Q), one obtains the





is the "ideal" price index for the basket of public goods (i.e. Pc
Pc-jk~'(tftD)Y]~G-I~Gg). Clearly, the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between
public and private goods must equal the marginal cost of public funds (q) times the relative
price of public goods in terms of private goods (P~~Pq).
Two etements cause the sum of the marginal rates of substitution to differ from the
marginal rate of transformation in production. First, the relative price of public and private
commodities (P~)Pq) depends not only on the relative costs in production but also on the
relative social costs in terms of environmental damage. Second, the marginal cost of publicla
funds (q) drives a wedge between the sum of the rates of substitution and the rate of transfor-
mation. It incorporates the costs of distortionary taxation and, in general, differs from unity.
For the chosen structure of preferences, BD-Bpp so that the dirt tax dces not affect the
marginal cost of funds directly and (4.7J reduces to:
1
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In a decentralised market economy, distortionary taxes raise the marginal cost of public funds
above unity if the financing of additional government spending erodes the base of existing
distortionary taxes. This is the case if both the labour tax (t~) and the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labour supply (cL~') are positive.
Combining (S.3J and (S.S), one obtains an expression for the trade-ofl' between public
consumption and environmental quality:
IS.7J
The marginal rate of substitution between public consumption and environmental quality must
equal the ratio of the price of public goods to the price for environmental quality ( i.e. the dirt
tax scaled by the dirt-emission rate for consumption). Note that, as both public consumption
and the environment are "collective" goods, the marginal cost of public funds (q) does not enter
(S.7).
Combining (4J0J and ( 5.3J, one finds that the marginal effect of abatement on the
quality of the environment equals the price of abatement in terms of the implicit price of the
environmenr.
e~(A)" - (tDló)~t. (5.8J
The optimum level of abatement increases with the implicit price of the envíronment (tp~d)
and thus with the Ievel of the dirt tax. This illustrates the principle that one should employ a
mix of environmental policy instruments.
6 Loglinearisatioo
We loglinearise the model around an initial equilibrium (in which lump-sum transfers
are zero) in order to explore how optimal policy should respond to changes in various
parameters. In particular, in sections 7 and 8 we analyse the comparative statics of private
behaviour and optimal government policy with respect to changes in environmental concernIS
(CE) and changes in concern about public consumption (I'~), respectively. Levels of variables
are denoted by capitals and the corresponding logarithmic deviations from the initial equilib-
rium values are denoted by small letters. However, arithmetic deviations from initial e-
quilibrium values for t;, normalised by P;,are denoted by t;; i~D,L.
6.! Private behaviour
Table 2(a) contains the compensated elasticities associated with the Hicksian demand
functions. Note that clean and dirty goods are Hicksian substitutes for a given sub-utility level
Q. However, for a given utility level M (or U), clean and dirty goods may be Hicksian
complements (if oM is large relative to oq) as an increase in the price of dirty products induces
substitution away from clean (and dirty) products towards leisure. Both clean and dirty
products are Hicksian substitutes for leisure. The ideal price indices are given by:
Dq -( I-ap) PC t aD pD
pM L(1-oy) Pq t ay pL a(1-oy) I(I-oD) pc t aD pD] t ay pL.
(6.1)
(6.11
"fable 2(b) reveals that utility of marketable goods (m) rises if lump-sum transfers or the real
consumption wage increase. Substitution of m from Table 2(a) yields the Marshallian demand
functions and the uncompensated demand elasticities reported in Table 2(b). For example, the
uncompensated elasticity of the Marshallian demand for leisure with respect to the con-
sumption wage (PL) is given by EyL~(I-oyxl-oM) and exceeds the compensated elasticity
cy~~0. An increase in the consumption wage has two effects on labour supply: (i) substitution
away from leisure towards clean and dirty commodities, thereby raising labour supply
(measured by e~LsOn,tav~O); ( ii) a boost in real income, which raises consumption of leisure,
thereby reducing labour supply (measured by the term -a~y). The substitution effect dominates
the income effect if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and Q, i.e. oM, exceeds unity.
Similarly, the uncompensated elasticity of the demand for clean products with respect to the
price of dirty products (ccp') depends crucially on the relative magnitudes of the substitution
elasticities oq and oM. Clean and dirty private goods are likely to be gross substitutes
(complements) when the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty products is large
(small) and the substitution elasticíty between private goods and leisure is small (large).
6.1 Equilihrium and the govcrnment budget constraint
The loglinearised version of the material balance condition for the economy is given by
(cf., equation (1.1)):16
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where w~-l~~L, í-C,D and wi~J~~NL, j~X,Y,A. Substituting the uncompensated demand
functions from Table 2(b), one finds (see Appendix):
mx x t ~,Y y t mw a z G(tí . uD (D') -(I-!L)BDap( I-ap)oq !D, (6.4)
where wc~~Xt~Yt~A-1-~C-~D`(L}(1-(L)BDGD denotes the national income share of public
spending and 0-1-wc'(IfeLL'). In view of Walras' law, (6.4) can also be viewed as the
reduced-form government budget constraint. Public spending must be financed from labour
and dirt tax revenues. Equation (6.4) allows for the erosion of taz bases as tax rates rise. To
illustrate, an increase in the labour tax rate increases revenues less than proportionally if the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply (eLL') exceeds zero. [n that case, an increase in
the labour tax induces people to work less, thereby eroding the base of the labour and dirt
taxes. An increase in the dirt tax rate has an additional adverse effect on the tax base. It
encourages consumers to shift from dirty to clean products, thereby eroding the base of the
dirt tax.
6.3 Prrvale utrlitv
Table 2(b) shows that private utility, msayvt(I-~y)q, may be written as a decreasing
function of both the tax on labour and the dirt tax:
m - - (1-Qy) ((í f GD fD'). (6.5)
Using (6.4), g~aYyf(I-aY)x (where ayaGYY~G denotes the (shadow) budget share of dirty
goods in public consumption), and
x- i'-~G tD (6.61
(i.e. the loglinearised version of (5.4)), we can decompose the effect on private utility as
follows (see Appendix):
m- -(1-av)~-t [(~x;~Y) 8 t mw a f X!D'1 (6.7)
where17
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(1-ar)aa. (6.8)
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Private utility suffers if public consumption (ga0) or public abatement increases (m0). The
term x captures the costs in terms of private utility of a shift towards a cleaner composition of
public and private consumption. In particular, a change in the composition of public con-
sumption towards cleaner goods harms private welfare. Finally, the excess burden of the dirt
tax in changing the composition of private consumption towards clean goods reduces utility
from marketable goods.
6.4 Environmerrtal qualil~~
Environmental quality depends on a number of effects (see Appendix):
1 1 I l-
r I
eD(aD-ar)(~I'~r)~ ~ (6.9) e - t3DaDr.~~a.xrD,t g
ap(l-eDap) I-epar
where from Table 2(b)
l ~ (ar ~(oy-t)m
lt-ar
(6.I0)
and aF-(tp~á)E~(N~l.) represents the ratio of the value of the environment to national income.
The first term in the square brackets in (6.9) shows that a shift to clean leisure improves
environmental quality. This shift corresponds to a lower leve! of economic activity (the
"volume" effect). The other three terms stand for changes in the composrtion of economic
activity. in particular, the second term denotes an increase in public abatement. The third term
reflects a shift from dirty to clean commodities in private and public consumption (see (6.8)).
The last term stands for a different distribution of activity over the public and private sectors.
If the (shadow) budget share of clean commodities in public goods is greater than in private
goods (ay~ap), public consumption is cleaner than private consumption and thus a higher level
of public consumption benefits the environment.
7 Shift towards greener preferences
To obtain explicit results about the way in public policy should respond to a change in
political preferences, marketable goods, public consumption and the environment are assumedIS
to be perfect substitutes in social utility. Hence, social utility can be written as
U-P~GtPeEtI'MM.~ Imperfect substitution would mitigate the allocational effects of a change
in political preferences on M, E and Q Furthermore, we assume that in the initial equilbrium
public and private consumption are equally dirty (i.e. aya~p). Hence, the fourth term in (6.9)
drops out.
7.1 A cfoser lonk at lhe "double dividend" hi~polhesLc
Environmental ~olicv
The trade-off between public consumption and environmental quality is given by





If consumption pollutes the environment (i.e. ay~0), the relative increase in the dirt tax
(tp'~BD) exceeds the relative increase in environmental concern (ryE-ry~). Intuitively, more
environmental concern requires an increase in the price of the environment (i.e. the dirt tax)
relative to the price of public consump[ion. If public consumption damages the environmen[, a
higher dirt tax raises not only the price of the environment but also the shadow price of public
goods, thereby offsetting some of the effect of the higher dirt tax on the relative price of the
environment to public consumption. Hence, the dirt tax has to rise more [o accomplish the
required increase in the relative price of the environment.
Comoosition of orivate and oublic snendine
The sotution for the dirt tax determines the optimal mix of dirty and clean public
goods from (6.6). It also determines the composition of public and private consumption from
Table 2 and optimal abatement from (5.8):
c-d-oqlp' (7.7)
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where o~ denotes the elasticity of productivity of public abatement. The increase in environ-
mental concern (ryE-ryC) pushes up the shadow price of the environment (tp), which changes
~ This function may also be interpreted as a complex interest function in which the weights
C~, iLG,E,M represent the bargaining strength of various social pressure groups. The solu[ion
to optimising this interest function also corresponds to an outcome of an etectoral competition
model (Drissen and van Winden, 1992).19
the composition of public and private consumption toward clean goods and raises public
abatement. The possibilities for substitution, as reflected by the elasticities o~ and oQ, deter-
mine the magnitude of the change in the composition of the consumption baskets. The rise in
public abatement is inversely related to the concavity of the abatement function e~(.).
('ost of vublic funds~ tax level and tax comnosition effects
Expression ( t,s) determines the trade-off between public and private consumption. It
can be writtcn as
1 rrrGllP~l i
MQn. (7.4)
The dirt tax does not affect the price ratio Pq~Po if private and public consumptior. are
equally dirty (ap-ay). Accordingly, the left-hand side of (7.4) is fixed as public and private
consumption (G and M) are perfect substitutes. The right-hand side corresponds to the
marginal cost of public funds in terms of private utility (M). The loglinearised version of (7.4)
is (see Appendix):
Yc - dloB(titQn) '




x ~ I - r~Il'(1-ay)(ay-1)l. ( 7.6 )
The first term in the square brackets at the right-hand side of (7.5) stands for the effect on
the cost of public funds of substituting a non-distortionary (dirt) tax for a distortionary
(labour) tax, while keeping private welfare (m) constant. This change in the tax structure
towards non-distortionary taxation cuts the cost of public funds if the elasticity of substitution
betwern private cunsumption commodities and leisure exceeds unity (oMSI) and the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is thus positive (ct~~a~(oM-I)~0). Indeed,
expression (5.61 reveals that lower distortionary labour taxation reduces the cost of public
funds if and only if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is positive. Intuitively,
public goods become easier to finance and the marginal cost of public funds declines if dirt
taxes aimed at internalising externalities rather than distortionary tazes are employed. This will
be called the "tax compositiort" effect because it involves a change in the composition of
taxation without affecting the level of private utility m and thus the overall tax level.
The second term in the square brackets at the right-hand side of (7.5) is the "taz leve!"
effect. It involves a fall in private welfare on account of an increase in the overall burden ofzo
taxation. In particular, tax rates rise for three reasons (compare expressions (6.5) and (6.7)): (i)
to compensate for the erosion of the base of the dirt tax; (ii) to pay for a cleaner composition
of public consumption; and (iii) to finance public abatement activities. Hence, the "tax level"
effects corresponds to the burden of making economic activity cleaner by undertaking public
abatement and changing the composition of public and private consumption baskets towards
clean commodities. It can be interpreted as the costs associated with an expanding social sector.
The social sector includes not only Samuetson-style public consumption goods but also the
quality of the environment. In "funding" this sector, the government levies explicit taxes for
public abatement and clean public consumption. Furthermore, the private sector pays implicit
taxes by incurring costs for the change in the composition of its own consumption basket (i.e.
the "excess" burden of dirt taxes). The higher tax level reduces the marginal benefits from
working, thereby exacerbating the distortionary effects of labour tazes. Indeed, the expansion
of the social sector raises the cost of public funds (in terms of utility) as long as substitution
between leisure and private goods is possible (i.e. oMiO).
The sign of the "tax composition effect" is ambiguous and depends on the relative
magnitude of income versus substitution effects. In particular, moving toward non-distor-
tionary dirt taxation reduces the cost of public funds only if the substitution effect of a higher
after-tax wage is sufficiently large relative to the income effect (i.e. oM~l). The sign of the
"tax level" effect, in contrast, is unambiguous; given that K is assumed to be positive8, a rise in
the tax level always raises the cost of public funds because onty substitution effects determine
the "tax level" effect. Intuitively, a"taz level" effect imposes a first-order loss in private
utili[y, thereby raising marginal private utility from private consumption goods (Mq). Hence,
the income effects of a higher tax level on the costs of public funds in terms of private utility
pMq (i.e. the right-hand side of (7.4)) cancel out. On the one hand, adverse income effects
associated with a higher tax level reduce the cost of public funds in terms of private con-
sumption (q) by reducing the demand for leisure and thus raising taxed labour supply. On the
other hand, these income effects increase the cost of public funds in terms of private utility by
reducing private utility (m) thus raising the marginal private utility from private goods (Mq).
Tax structure: Labour taxation
Upon elimination of m in (7.5) and using (6.5), one obtains an inverse relationship
between the tax on labour and the dirt tax (see Appendix). Hence, a rise in environmental
concern, which is accompanied by a higher dirt tax, reduces the tax on labour. Conventional
wisdom about environmental concern causing a shift away from labour taxa[ion is thus correct.
e This will be the case if t~~} or avrl or oM~l.21
i,evel of economic activitv and emolovment
Table 3 contains the detailed effects of an increase in environmental concern on the
optimal levels of various instruments of government policy and on other important variabtes.
Although the (explicit) tax on labour falls, employment does not rise (see Table 3). In fact, if
the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply differs from zero (i.e. oM~:l), labour
supply falls. Intuitively, a reallocation from labour to leisure benefits the environment; the
consumption of leisure does not pollute while employment indirectly harms the environment
because part of labour income is spent on dir[y goods. The fall in employment and output is
especially Iarge if the (initiaq national income share of the public sector is substantial. Hence,
the popular version of the "double dividend" argument - increased environmental concern
raises employment - fails.
Proposition 1: A higher pnlitical preJerence Jor a cleaner environntent raises the dirt tax and
rcdures !he lahuur ta,r. The highcr dirt tax pie(ds a cleanc~r composition oJ private and public
catsumption baskets and a higher level of public abatement. Despite a lower (abour tax.
emplnt~ment JafLs unless the suhstitutiort elasticitr between private eonsumption of eommodities
and leisure is one.
7.1 Puhlic consumption: Are red and greert policies compatible?
Public consumption is affected through two main channels. The first term in square
brackets in the expression for public consumption in Table 3 stands for the "tax composition"
effect. This effect makes green and red preferences compatible in the sense that public
consumption and environmental quality move together. In particular, substituting dirt for
labour taxes reduces the marginal cost of public funds if existing distortionary taxes imply a
marginal cost of public funds (q) greater than unity, i.e. if the substitution effect of lower
labour taxation dominates the income effect (oM~ I)(see expression (5.6)).
The second term in square brackets in the expression for public consumption in Table
3 represents the "tax level" effect. It implies a negative link between public consumption and
environmental concern and reflects the private welfare costs of environmental protection on
account of a cleaner composition of economic activity. These costs exacerbate the deadweight
loss associated with distortionary (labour) taxation, thereby raising the cost of public funds.
The overall effect of greener preferences on public consumption depends on the
balance between the "tax composition" and the "tax level" effects. In particular, environmental
quality and public consumption move together, and red and green preferences are thus
compatible, only if the "tax level" effect is small compared to the "tax composition" effect. The
"tax level" effect is small if dirt taxes constitute a small part of the price oC dirty goods (i.e. BD
small) and, at the same time, the substitution elasticity between dirty and clean goods (oQ) iszz
small (see expressions (7.5), (6.7) and (6.8)). !n that case, changes in the composition of the
private consumption basket are not only small (because oq is small) but also cheap (because of
the narrow tax base). The "tax composition" effect gains in importance if substitution between
leisure and private consumption goods is strong (i.e. if aM is large) and hence labour taxes are
especially distortionary (see expression (7.5)). Accordingly, the "tax composition" effect is
large relative to the "tax level" effect if substitution between leisure and private commodities is
easy compared to substitution between clean and dirty private commodities. Green and red
preferences are thus compatible if dirty and clean private goods are complements. In that case,
the tax on labour and the dirt tax yield similar effects. In particular, a labour tax is a good
instrument to improve the environment as it reduces private consumption of dirty commodities
by raising the consumption of clean leisure. Furthermore, by reducing the real after-tax wage,
a dirt tax acts like a labour tax because it leaves the composition of private consumption
largely unaffected if the substitution elasticity between clean and dirty goods is small. Hence,
a dirt tax is a rather efficient instrument to fund public spending (due to the small excess
burden from changing the composition of private demand).
Red and green political preferences can be compatible only if the substitution elasticity
between leisure and private commodities (oM) is large. Table 3 reveals that in that case labour
supply declines substantially. The intuition is that a fall in employment (i.e. more "inactivity")
is socially undesirable only if it is due to a distortionary tax on labour. Social welfare is
enhanced, however, if employment declines on account of a dirt tax reflecting the social cos[
of environmental degradation. Indeed, increased environmental concern should make work less
attractive, because part of labour income is spent on dirty goods. This is in fact consistent with
green parties advocating a reduction in the length of the working week. Since the disincentive
effects of high tax levels on labour supply are no longer socially undesirable, environmental
concern facilitates the financing of public consumption.9
Accordingly, red and green are compatible if most of the improvement in environmen-
tal quali[y is accomplished through a lower level of economic activity and employment. Hence,
a tension emerges between the desire to increase the participation (of women) in the labour
force while at the same time maintaining public consumption and improving environmental
quality. The objectives of enhancing environmental quality and raising labour participation do
not conflict only if the substitution elasticity between leisure and private commodities is close
to unity (oMwl) while substitut;on elasticities between clean and dirty goods in private and
public consumption (aq and o~) are large and the effectiveness of abatement actitivities in
cleaning up the environment does not decline rapidly. In that case, the tax level effect
dominates the tax composition effect and the improvement in environmental quality is accom-
9 A fall in employment is undesirable if it is due to a higher (distortionary) Iabour tax on
account of the "tax level" effect.23
piished primarily through a cleaner composition of economic activity rather than a lower level
of that activity.to This implies that activity and employment are not discouraged. Hence, the
disincentive effects of high tax levels are undesirable and public consumption therefore
becomes more rather than less expensive.
Proposition 2 Public consumption rises with a higher politica! preference for a cleaner
environment (a "sncial" double dividend) iJ and only if oM is large (ezceeds one) and, at the
same time. o~ and vq are small and v~ large. Accordingly, clean and dirty commodities need to
be complements Jor red attd green preferences to be compatible. Furthermore, lhe "tax com-
position" eJJect should dominate the "tax level" eJJect in determining the marginal cost of
public funds. In the case oJ a social double dividend. most of the improvement in environmental
qualitv is achieved through a lower level of activity rather than a cleaner eomposition oJ that
activitv.
7.3 Economic cnsls oJ an explicit green target
Environmentalists and government plans often demand explicit improvements in the
quality of the environment, but rarely explain how these green targets should be achieved in
practice. This subsection explores the question what the best instruments are to achieve a
particular absolute green target for the quality of the environment, say E~E~. It also examines
the welfare costs of such a [arget. Social welfare may be split up into three components: (i) the
quality of the environment E; (ii) the utility of the basket of public consumption goods G; (iii)
the utility of the basket of marketable goods M("private welfare"). A green target implies an
improvement in (i) and, if the economy was at an optimum before the green target was set,
must reduce either public consumption or private welfare or both.
Cleaner economic activitv: Choice of instruments
If the income and substitution effects of wages on labour supply offset each other (i.e.
vM-1), the environment is improved by changing the composition rather than the level of
economic activity. The higher implicit tax level associated with cleaner economic activity (and
hence a cteaner environment, which has the features of a social good) raises the marginal cost
of public funds. Hence, the environment crowds out conventional public consumption and thus
implies a shift towards "public poverty". Private utility, tabour supply and the level of
economic activity are not affected in this special case.
Three environmental policy instruments can be employed to render economic activity
more friendly to the environment, namely public abatement, cleaner public consumption and a
lo Note that the tax level effect involves a different (and cleaner) composition of economic
activity while the tax composition effect reduces the leve! of activity.24
dirt tax aimed at cleaner private consumption. Abatement makes a major contribution to a
cleaner environment if the productivity of abatement is not very sensitive to the level of
abatement (i.e. a~ is small). Cleaner public consumption is important if substitution between
clean and dirty goods in public consumption is easy (i.e. o~ is large). The dirt tax plays a large
role if economic activity is dirty (i.e. BDaYaBpap large, see (7.l)), substitution between the two
public goods is difficult and the productivity of abatement diminishes rapidly with the level of
abatement (o~ large). In that case, most of the improvement in environmental qualiry mus[ be
accomplished by changing the composition of private consumption. This change may be
brought about by a dirt tax or, perhaps more naturally, by auctioning off tradeable polluton
permits. Ir. the latter case, the price that the government will fetch for a permit equals the dirt
tax.
Chanee in the level of economic activitv
Economic activity cannot become cleaner if substitution in private and public
consumption is not possible (o~-oQ-O) and the optimal level of abatement is constant (i.e.
o~yoo). In this special case, environmental quality is enhanced only through a reduction in [he
level of economic activity and employment. If income effects dominate substitution effects
(oM~l), the public sector pays for the cleaner environment. The associated Iower tax level
increases private utility, thereby raising the demand for (clean) leisure. Accordingly, large
private incomes due to a small public sector benefit the environment. In [his case, there is a
"double dividend" in that both environmental quality and private utility increase while public
consumption falls. Hence, if oM~l, green and blue preferences are compatible.
However, if substitution between leisure and private commodities is easy and the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is thus positive (oM exceeds unity), the
environment crowds out private utility and crowds in public consumption. In that case, a
higher tax level encourages substitution towards clean Ieisure. Hence, a large public sector
accompanied by a high tax level benefits the environment. In this case, green and red political
preferences are compatible as both environmental quality and public consumption increase.
This scenario amounts to a more social type of "double dividend".
Proposition 3: IJ oM is smaller than one, a cleaner environment hoosts private welJare and
crowds out public consumption. Hence, a double dividend oJ a cleaner environment and higher
private welJare emerges (i.e. blue and green political preJerences are compatible). However, iJ
ot,t exceeds one, a cleaner environment crowds ou[ private welJare. If oM equals one, environ-
merrtal qunlity is enhanced entirely lhrough a clearter composition rather than a lower level oJ
activity. Public consumption bears all costs associated wilh [he deaner composition oJ activity
while private welJare is unaJJecled.zs
8 A shift towards redder preferences
T~x structure and emulovment
Table 4 contains the effects o( an increase in the social priority attached to public con-
sumption, i.e. a shift towards redder political preferences (7~a0). Equation (7.1) shows that
the dirt tax falls. This seems counter-intuitive because a rise in public consumption requires
higher tax rates. However, labour rather than dirt taxes rise to finance higher public spending.
The intuition is that a higher price for public consumption raises the cost of public funds.
Hence, revenue raising rather than environmental protection becomes a more important
objective of the tax system. The government is thus Iess able to afford the use of "inefficient"
tax instruments from the point of view of raising revenues. Indeed, expression (4.6) reveals
that the dirt tax falls if the cost of public funds (tf) rises. A shift towards more conventional
public goods thus requires a higher labour tax rate but a lower dirt tax rate.
Higher public consumption reduces employment if the marginal cost of public funds
exceeds unity (i.e. oM~l). In that case, the substitution effect of higher taxation reducing
after-tax wages (i.e. the disincentive effect) exceeds the income effect of lower private utility.
Proposition 4: A higher social preference for puhlir corrsumption raises the labour ta.r and
reduces the dirt lax. Emplorment declirres iJ and onlr~ iJ aM exceeds one. The lower dirt ta.r
pields a dirtier composition aJ public and private consumption and less puhlic aba[emrn[.
Pr~blic consumotion orivate welfare and environmental aualitv
Private utility always suffers. Hence, red and blue political preferences are not
compatible. The magnitude of the fall in private welfare depends on the substitution elasticity
between leisure and private commodities (oM). If this elasticity is large, private welfare suffers
less. In that case, the cost of public funds increases rapidly as public consumption expands.
Hence, public consumption does not rise much.
Comparison of Tables 3 and 4 reveals the following symmetry: the sign and nature of
the effect of a shift towards redder preferences on the quality of the environment is the same
as the effect of a shift [owards greener preferences on public consumption. In particular,
environmental quality and public const.mption move together and red and green preferences
are thus compatible, if dirty and clean goods are complements (i.e. oq small, oM large) and if
the composition of public spending is insensitive to the (shadow) price for pollution (i.e. o~
small and o~ large). If oq and o~ are small, the lower dirt tax dces not induce a large shift
toward dirty commodities in private and public consumption. Furthermore, public abatement
does not fall much if the productivity of abatement rises rapidly as abatement falls (i.e. o~
large). Moreover, the higher labour tax acts as an implicit dirt tax and, if oM is large, improves
the environment by reducing economic activity. Indeed, one reaps a social double dividend ofzt,
a cleaner environment and more public consumption only if employment falls. In that case, the
change in the level and structure of taxes shifts private demand to (clean) leisure rather than
dirty commodities.
The environment suffers if the substitution elasticity between leisure and other private
goods (op,t) is small, substitution in private and public consumption baskets is strong (oQ,o~
large), and the productivity of abatement dces not rise rapidly as abatement falls (o~ small). In
this case, both the level of economic activity (labour supply) rises and the composition of this
activity becomes dirtier. In particular, the adverse private income effect associated with a
higher taz level boosts labour supply. Not only does the income effect exceed the substitution
effect, but the small substitution effect causes the marginal cost of public funds to rise only
slowly as the public sector expands. Accordingly, the tax level, and therefore employment,
rise substantially. Higher output raises the sum of private and public consumption. As regards
the composition of economic activity, the lower dirt tax induces a lot of substitution towards
dirty consumption goods if oQ and o~ are large. Moreover, public abatement falls substantially
if o~ is small.
Public consumption rises most if labour taxes are not very distortionary (i.e oM is
small) and the lower dirt tax makes a lot of room for public consumption (through less
abatement and "cheaper" (i.e. dirtier) public and private consumption). In other words, the
lower dirt tax reduces the cost of public funds significantly while the higher labour tax does
not raise this cost much. The environment pays for the lower dirt tax as it raises pollution.
Private utility suffers on account of the higher labour tax.
Proposition 5: A higher social preJerertce Jor public consumption crowds out privtue welJare
(i.e. red and blue preJrences are incompatibleJ. Environmenta! quality is improved iJ and only
iJ oM is large and, at [he .same time. oQ and v~ are sma!! and o~ is large. Irr thi.s case. economic
activitv declines but does not become much dirtier while public consumption does not rise mucb.
9 Concluding remazks
The "double dividend" hypothesis put (orward by many politicians is a red herring.
Although it is optimal to raise the dirt tax and reduce the labour tax in response to increased
environmental concern, employment typically falls. Dirt taxes are explicitly designed to
encourage a change in the composition of private consumption towards cleaner goods. This
imposes a cost in terms of private utility, which tends to worsen pre-existing tax distortions by
eroding the base of existing distortionary taxes. Moreover, increased environmental concern
may make public consumption more expensive and raise public abatement. The implied higher
overall tax level is especially costly if existing tazes impose serious distortions. Indeed,
countries with a large public sector often find it costly to implement a tough environmentalz7
policy because such a policy may erode the tax base and thus require even higher marginal tax
rates thereby raising the cost of public funds.
To attenuate the adverse effects of environmental policy on labour market distortions
and the cost of public funds, it may be necessary to reduce the size of the public sector.
Indeed, we have shown that it is optimal to reduce public consumption in response to increased
environmental concern if the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure is
small and between clean and dirty goods is large. In this case, the environment is improved, in
par[, through a different composition of economic activity. The costs accompanying this
structural change in economic activity raise the cost of public funds, thereby reducing public
consumption. However, if substitution between clean and dirty commodities is more difficult
and the productivity of public abatement declines rapidly, a cleaner environment must be
achieved primarily through less production and more consumption of leisure. [n that case, the
public sector may expand if the substitution effects due to lower after-tax wages are large.
The intuition is that the disincentive effects due to high tax levels are no Ionger undesirable.
Indeed, public consumption becomes easier to finance as non-distortionary taxes are available.
Hence, in this case, green political parties are compatible with red political parties. More
specifically, red and green preferences are likely to be compatible only if clean and dirty
goods are complements, dirt and labour taxes induce similar behavioural effects, and the
environment is enhanced through a lower level of economic activity.
An important direction of future research is to abandon the world of representative
agents and extend the analysis of this paper to address equity issues. Efficiency considerations
may Iead governments to tax necessities more heavily than luxuries. Clearly, this violates the
objective of equity. Increased environmental concern may imply heavier taxes on dirty
necessities, less progressive taxes on labour and less public consumption. Since an equitable
income distribution may be viewed as a Dublic good (cf., Thurow, 1971), it is of interest to
investigate the trade-uff belween the variuus public goods (public consumption of clean and
dirty products, the quality of the natural environment and an equitable income distribution).
This line of analysis should benefit from abandoning the assumption of homothetic preferen-
ces. For example, if one allows for subsistence levels of consumption and allows for necess-
ities, one can shed more light on the issue of basic needs and equity in relation to environ-
mental policy.
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Substituting expressions for !, c and d from Table 2(b) into (6.3) yields:
~~' ~rY' ~Aa - (ay1)av(~c'~n-1)(tcta~d ' (~c'ad~(~c'~~
- OQí~~41~.Cp-fJD(1-Qd~.
(A.I)
Use of wctwp-l-wo', wc~(1-i~)(I-~D) and mD-(1-BD)(1-t~)~p in (A.1) yields (6.4).
Derivation oJ (6.7) and (6.8J
With the aid of (6.4), we obtain29
(wzz.wyy.w~al ((1 rJeaao(1 ap)u~ol
ri' at{n'11
1. II 1 e e
w hich upon suhslitutinn into r M1.51 yiclds:
m'-(I-av)A~~Iwzz.wrY'w~a,(1-tJODaa(1-a~oQt'D].
Using gzayi~t(I-ay)x and (6.6) 6 ves:
wzs'wrYz(wz'wr)8`a~nlaro'z-(1-ar)wrl.
Given that
w-(w w)I 1-ar 1
and w s(w .w )(ar,(1-0~1,
z z' r`1-0aay r z r1 1-goarl
one can rewrite (A.4) as:
w r; ` w rY' (wz'w y)8' (w,' w r)I 1-01Da r1






Substitution of (A.6) into (A.3) and using I-t~L(rvo.~,p)~(1-epap) yields (6.7) and (6.8).
Derivation of (6.9)
Loglinearisation of (5.2) and multiplication by ~g-tpE)6N14L yields (upon substitution
of 15.81):
( rpDl ( rDY l ( ~~'l( rdt
a`e- l 9LId 1N9LlY~l 8 IINBL a-
-(eaao(1-rJ)d-(w x'w,)I lOeDár IY' wxa'
(wzx'wrY'w~a)-(wz'wr) Y'w~a .
' 1-0 a 1-w~ n r ~~(1-rJeDaa~ ` eDar ~ 1
(A.7)
Using (6.4) (after eliminating ty'-~'t~ptp' from (6.5)) and the expression for d from Table
2(b), we can rewrite the term in the first set of square brackets on the (last) right-hand side of
(A.7) as:
Using (A.6) and ( I-tL)(I-wG')-t-(I-Bpap)-1, the term in the second set of square brackets on
the (last) right-hand side of (A.7) may be written as:
wzs,wyyfw~a
-((1-tJeaa~ d.l 1 . ,
1-w~30
d; 1-~~c 1- 1-aY'ayaY 1-~c 1-av-(
1-rvc ~rz}~'Y~~Aa ~ p, 1 m 1-adad~l}p rJeDaDJ
~av(or I)~ m (1-adaornl









Finally, substituting (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.71, using (I-IL)'(~Ct~D)(1-BDaD) 1 and
making use of definition (6.8) yields (6.9).
Derivation of (7.5)





dlo 1dQl - I oyl(v-9) - -I l~ávJ
m.
We use FL~ from Table 2(b) and a~-V to rewrite (5.6) as
r
l -rL ~ '-~ j~"`a" 1'~




We substitute tL from (6.5) and v--(oM-I )m (see Table 2(b)) and obtain:






Combining (A.11) and (A.14) we obtain:31





1-ay 1-tL(l.a y(oM-1) 1-t~(lray(o~ 1))
Upon substituting OMajl-tL(14a~,(oM-I))]~t for the term in square brackets in (A.IS), we
obtain (7.5).
Derivation of Tables 3 and 4
All entries can be written as functions of níamJ( I-av)--(t~-[i'taplD~ (using (6.5)) and
tD .[L' follows immediately from the definition of m'. Equations (tí.b), (7.2) and (7.3) give,
respectively, .r-~~, c-d and a. Eliminating m from the definition of nt' and a from (tS.7) and
using the definition of p(see Table 1), we obtain:
i ~A ~ i ~ (~j~~r)á ` -ORI - X' to ~ - ~fi -Ptp.
er,o,,
(A.16)
Equations (h.91 and (6.l0) with aD~ay (and substituting (7.3) to eliminate a and using the
definition of p) gives
AOaD(Oy-1)6 ylM~tQ7D
L - - ~.
aL(1-eDa~
(A.17)
Equation (6.I0) gives 1-(aM-I )avm'.
To complete Tables 3 and 4, we need expressions for [D' and m'. Equation (7.1)
amounts ro a reduced-form expression for rD'. Upon substitution of this expression for [D' into
(7.i), we obtain:
o l a 9 f l
m, --( wK, 1-Aoar Ya-I a~~(1-eoa~1
7a
Proof that !L falls if ryE ~ 0
Looking at the en[ry for tti in Table 3, we need to establish that:
(A.18)
F(o~)~o~ti[1-(l-a~(o~ 1)]sl. (A.19)
Since w ' t t(I-r )B a and stabilit re uires G~O, t cannot exceed (1-rr to a t G- L L D D y q L V M V) ~
For oM~l, it is then possible to show that:
F(o~)
oM~l.(1-ay)-(1-a~orl~l. (A.20) a JI
(t-a ~~4ya y
For oM~l, tL~l and one can also establish that F(oM)'~0, F(1)~I and thus F(oM)~1. The only
case that [~LO is oMetL-I.32
Table 1: Notatioo
N number of households
U social welfare
E quality of the environment
A level of abatement activities
M utility of marketable goods
G utility of the basket of clean and dirty public goods (i.e. public consumption)
X,Y consumption of clean and dirty public goods
Q utility of the basket of clean and dirty private goods
C,D consumption of clean and dirty private goods
V,L leisure and labour supply
T (lump-sum) income transfers from government to private agents
Pc,PD consumption prices of clean and dirty products in private consumption
tD tax (rate) on private consumption of dirty products
fDp Pigovian component of the dir[ tax
PL,p consumption wage (~(I-t~)) and producer wage
tL tax rate on labour income
BD tD~PD
BL tL~(1-tL)
t;' deviation of t;, normalised by P;, i-D,L
Pq ideal price index for the basket of private consumption goods
P~ ideal (shadow)price index of public consumption
a marginal utility of private income
~,n marginal disutility and marginal cost ({~~a) of public funds
n u~a.
aD budget share of dirty products in private consumption (PDD~PLL)
tY~ budget share of leisure in marketable goods (M~V~M-V)
oy (shadow) budget share of dirty goods in public consumption (GYY~G)
aE ratio of value of environment to national income ((tD~d)E~(N~L))
w; national income share of good i (I~~NL,i-X,Y,A, ~~~L,i~C,D)
wc' national income share of public spending ((XfYfA)~pNL)
wE value of environment as fraction of national income (tpE~6p~NL)
oM elasticity of substitution between Q and V
o~,oq elasticities of substitution between X and Y and between C and D
o~ elasticity of productivity of public abatement (-e~~A~e~~)
e;~ uncompensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to price j
e;~ compensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to price jI'~ weight of I in social welfare UsI'GG~I'gEtfMM





X defined in (6.8)
Table 2: (a) Compensated demand elasticities (c~~)
pG pD~~D' pL~-!L m
9 -at~~y( 1 - ~p) -oM~V~D ~M~Y 1
v oM(I-~y)(1-4rD) OM(1-~Y)trD - oM(1-Oty) 1
l -OM~VÍI-~p) -oM~y~p aM~y -~yI(1-ay)
C -ap(OQ-OMQy)-OMQy QD(oQ-aMQy) OMQY 1
d ( I -ap)(oQ-oM~y) ~p(r7Q-OM~y)-~Q ~A.t~y 1
Table 2: (b) Uncompensated demand elasticities (e~~')
pG pD-tD' pL--!L' T
m -(1-~p)(I-~y) -~p(1-~y) 1-~V I-~V
4 -(1 -~DH(oM- I )aYf I ] -aD[(oM- I )ayt I ] (vM- I )~Yt I I -ay
v (1-~p)(oM-1)(t-~y) ~p(D~.t-lxl-~y) (I-~M)(I-~y) 1-~y
( (1'~p)(1-DA{)~y ~p(1-ot~)~y (OM-I)~V -~V
~' -~DOQ-( I-ap)[(aM- I)ayt l] oD[oQ-(oM-1)~y- I] (oM- I~yf l I-ay
d (I-~p)I~Q-(Q~{-I)~y-lJ -(I-~p)OQ
-aD[(aM- I )ayt I ]
(OM-1)~ytl 1-Oty
~ This column gives semi-elasticities with respect to changes in T~PLL.Table 3: Shift towards greener preferences
34
ryE~O
lD~ ( 1-BDay ) 1Bp ~ O
fí -(I-BpnD)"18DapoM-1K"1(1-oMfL[I-(I-~y)(oM-I))) ~ O
a (I-Bpap)-lo~"t i 0
8 (I-Bpnp)"1BD[~D~K 1oM 1(~t,{-I)-P)(~Xf~y)-1
x-Y (I-Bpay)-1BD0~ i O
nt ( I-BD~D) iBDaDK 1~M t( I-OM)( I-[YV ) ~ 0 if aM ~ I
C-!~ ( I -Bpay) 1BDOQ ~ 0
e ( I-BD~D) 1BD[BDáDZK 10M 1(OM- I)Z~VtP)
[aE( I-BDrrD] 1 i ~
~ -(I-Bp~p)iBp~pK"lOM-1(OM-I)ZIYVGO
Table 4: Shift towards redder preferences
ry~~0
!D' -(I-BDrYy)"1Bp ~ O
!L (I-BDaD) 1[~K lOM ltry 1fBDaD] ~ O
a -(I-BDap)-lo~"1 ~ 0
8 (I-Bp~p) 3I~ZK 10M 1~V I{PBD)(tuXft~ly) 1 i O
x-Y -(I-BpQy)"1BDo~ ~ 0
n7 -( ~ -BpQp) ~~OM"1K"1( I -Qy)Qy"1 ~ ()
C-li -(I-BDrYy)-1BDOQ ~ 0
e (I-BD~D) 1BD[~D~K 1QM 1(oM-I)-P)[~E(I-Bp~p]-1
~ (I-BD~D) 1(I-oM)~oM"1K"1 ~ O if oM ~ 135
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